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PORTRAYING　“AUTHENTIC　EXISTENCE”　BY　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　METHOD　OF
ANALOGY：TOWARD　CREATIVE　USES　OF　THE　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ANALOGY　OF
ATTRIBUTION　Dσ01～σル1　AD　7「ERTYUル1　FOR
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COMPARA－
　　　　　　TIVE　PHILOSOPHY　OF　RELIGION＊
Part　I
Tokiyuki　Nobuhara
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　htroduction
　　　　　This　essay　is　so　composed　as　to　portray“authentic　existence”
as　it　apPears　in　at　least　three　types　of　philosophy　of　religion：
Thomism，　Protestant　Confessionalism，　and　Whiteheadian　process
thought　as　it　can　be　compared　with　the　Nishida　School　of
Buddhist　philosophy　in　Japan．　The　method　of　study　I　am　going
to　employ　below　is　analogical．
　　　　　　Needless　to　say，　the　notion　of“authehtic（eigen〃ich）
existence”@as　a　philosophical　question　originates　in　the　thought
of　Martin　Heidegger　in　his　celebrated　volume　Sein　und　Zeit
（1927）and　designates　the　mode　of　our　human　projection　of　any
concrete　act　in　view　of　the　whole　structure　of　what　we　really
are　or　Existentiale．　Heidegger　counts　as　such　authentic　modes
とliscovery　of　self　as　already　in　the　world（Bilfindlicheeiの，understanding
（Verstehen），　and　discourse（Rede）．An　inauthentic（uneigen〃ich）
mode　of　standing－in，　on　the　contrary，　is　one　in　which　Dasein，
so　concemed　with　the　necessities　of　daily　life，　relates　himself　to
things　by　projections　which　ignore　the　implication　of　the　full
structure　of　his　possibilities－that　is，　by　projections　such　as
ambiguity（Zweideutigkeit），curiosity（Neugier），and　prattle
（Gerede）．1
　　　　　Let　me，　however，　fortell　here　that　my　use　of　the　notion
of“authentic　existence”is　not　necessarily　the　same　as　Heidegger’s．
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In　the　present　essay　I　am　standing　on　the　premise　that　this
notion　can　be　used　in　a　broader　sense　than　Heidegger　originally
meant　in　Sein％雇Zeit．　This　is　in　part　because　he　himself　later
came　through　the　Kehre　of　his　thought　to　the　position　in　which
the　authentic　existence　began　to　be　coterminous　with　the
Dasein’sdevotion　or　correspondence（Entsperechung）to　the　ultimate
reality，　the　Wahrangゴθ7　Wahrheit，　the　verifying　of　truthla－a
drastic　break－through　of　his　existentialist－phenomenological
analysis　of　Dasein．　What　I　have　in　mind　is　that　we　can　refer　to
any　mode　of　existence　as“authentic”if　it　corresponds　positively
to　the“fundamental　structure　of　reality”of　whatever　sort．　And
since“positive　correspondence”@is　the　intent　of　the　concept　of
analogy，　for　instance　in　Karl　Barth，lb　I　shall　pursue　the　portrayal
of“authentic　existence”in　terms　of　a　study　of　the　problem　of
analogy　as　regards　the　afore－mentioned　three　types　of　philosophy
of　religion．
　　　　　More　specifically，　I　shall　engage　in　elucidating　two　creative
possibilities　for　the　enterprise　of　comparative　philosophy　of
religion　of　today　of　the　use　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　dzanu〃2
ad　tertiam（two　to　the　third），one　of　the　four　types　of　the
theological　analogy　that　Thomas　Aquinas　dealt　with　under　the
general　heading　of　Analogia　Entis．　Let　me　first　clarify　the
position　of　this　analogy　in　the　whole　scheme　of　Aquinas’
doctrine　of　Analogia　Entis　and　then　articulate　my　intention　of
creative　uses　of　it．
　　　　　Section　I：ACritical　Survey　of　the　Thomist　Doctrine
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Analogy
　　　　　The　analogy　of　attribution　duomm　ed　tertium　is　an　analogy
that　is　valid　between　two　entities　due　to　the　relation　that　each
of　them　bears　to　a　third．　For　example，　if　the　adjective“healthy”
is　applied　to　both　Fort　Worth　and　the　complexion　of　Mr．　Smith
who　lives　there，　this　double　attribution　of　the　adjective　can
only　be　guaranteed　as　legitimate　on　the　condition　that　in　its
strict　and　primary　application　the　adjective　applies　neither　to
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Fort　Worth　nor　to　the　complexion　but　to　Mr．　Smith．　Therefore，
one　may　say　that　Fort　Worth　induces，　the　complexion　of　Mr．
Smith　manifests，　and　Mr．　Smith　enjoys，　health．
　　　　　　It　is　well　known　that　Aquinas　himself　has　constantly
warned　against　its　use　in　theology．2　This　might　be　because　this
type　of　analogy　can　have　little　or　no　apPlication　to　the　case，
according　to　E．　L．　Mascall，　where　we　are　attributing　the　same
predicate　to　God　and　to　creature，　for“there　is　no　being　antecedent
to　God　to　whom　the　predicate　can　apply　more　formally　and
properly　than　it　applies　to　him．”2a　The　over－all　negative　attitu’р
among　Thomistic　thinkers　toward　this　type　of　analogy　is　therefore
expressive　of　their　basic　theological　stance，　transcendental
theism．　For　them　there　can　be，　in　the　universe，　no　reality
more　real　or　more　ultimate　than　God；therefore，　God　is　to　be
called　Ipsum　Esse　Subsistens．　That　is　to　say，　their　negation　of
this　analogy　is，　from　a　proper　theological　perspective，　a　result
of　their　identification　of　the　religious　ultimate（i．e．，God）with
the　metaphysical　ultimate（i．e．，Being）．
　　　　　　From　this　perspective，　the　reason　why　the　analogy　of
attribution　duonem　ed　tertium　is　to　be　ruled　out　is　commensurate
with　the　reason　why　the　analogy　of　attribution　unias　ad　altentm
（one　to　another）has　to　be　maintained．　In　this　latter　type　of
analogy　the　predicate　belongs　formally　and　properly　to　one　of
the　analogates（or，　more　accurately　，　to　the加祝θanalogate），
and　only　relatively　and　derivatively　to　the　other．3　Theologically，
this　means　that　God　is　the　cause　of　creatures　and　all　that　they
have；therefore，　the　word“good，”for　instance，　applies　properly
and　infinitely　to　God，　but　only　derivatively　and　finitely　to
creatures．　In　my　opinion，　this　type　of　analogy　can　best　be
understood　in　terms　of　Henry　N．　Wieman’sdistinction　between
“created　goods”and“Creative　Good．”What　is　important　in　this
analogy　is　God’srelation　of　creation　over　the　world．　Hence，
creatures　are　to　be　considered“effects－implying－cause．”
　　　　　Because　the　identification　of　God　with　Being　is　central　in
Thomism，　and　because　this　identification　is　combined　with　the
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notion　of　Creator，　God　for　Thomists　is　primum　et〃zaxime　ens　as
well　as　ipsum　e∬e　subsistens．　This　view　of　God　is　the　very　basis
for　the　third　and　most　famous　type　of　analogy，　the　analogy　of
proper　proportionality．　This　type　of　analogy　consists　in　the
ProPortionality，
　　　　　　essence　of　creature　　　　　　　essence　of　God
　　　　　　existential　act　of　creature　　　existential　act　of　God．
　　　　　　There　are　three　principles　operative　in　the　analogical
constitution　of　this　proportionality：（1）the　relation　of　creation；
（2）　the　priority　of　existence；and　（3）　the　intra－theistic　identity
of　existence　and　essence．4　There　are　some　debates　among
Thomists　as　to　which　principle　is　pivotal　in　maintaining　the
bond　in　the　proportionality．　For　instance，　for　R．　Garrigou－Lagrange
the　third　principle　is　pivotal　because　the　third　term　in　the
formula　is　given　to　us　in　and　through　the　analogy，　whereas　for
M．T．L．　Penido　the　second　principle　is　pivotal　because　the
fourth　term　is　given　to　us　1励（rr　to　the　analogy．5　However，　as　to
the　essential　importance　of　the　first　principle　there　is　no　split　of
opinions　among　Thomists．　At　any　rate，　it　is　important　that　in
this　type　of　analogy　Thomists　are　attempting　to　answer　one　of
the　most　significant　questions　in　philosophical　theology：How
are　Being，　God，　and　beings　related　to　each　other？
　　　　　　The　fourth　type　of　analogy　is　the　analogy　of　metaphorical
proportionality．6　For　instance，　the　lion　is　called　the　king　of　the
beasts　because　he　bears　to　savage　animals　a　relation　similar　to
that　which　a　king　bears　to　his　subjects．　But　Thomists　do　not
regard　this　type　of　analogy　as　theologically　significant．　This
might　be　largely　connected　with　their　inability　of　accounting　for
the　responsive，　salvific　nature　of　God，　the　nature　we　predicate
of　deity，　as　when　we　say，“The　Lord　is　my　shepherd．”
　　　　　　As　stated　earlier，　the　purpose　of　this　essay　is　to　portray
“authentic　existence”　by　elucidating　the　possibility　of　creatively
using　the　analogy　of　attribution　duαntmα4　tertium　for　comparative
philosophy　of　religion．　For　I　contend　that　the　reason　for　Thomjsts’
nagation　of　the　analogy　is　theologically　untenable．　They　say
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that　there　is　no　being　antecedent　to　God．　If　they　mean　creature
by　being，　they　are　right．　But　we　could　refer　to　that　which　is
antecedent　to　God　as　something　greater　than　creature－e．g，，
Being　or　the　Divine．　And　yet　I　do　not　mean　by　this　any
intention　of　subsuming　God　under　the　highest　generalization，
the　concept　of　being，　because　if　that　be　the　case　I　as　a　human
being　in　my　thinking　might　thereby　gain　control　over　God，
who　subsequently　might　become　a　concept　at　my　disposal．
Rather，　I　mean　Being　as　the　ultimate　metaphysical　rea〃砂
antecedent，　metaphysically，　to　God　as　the　ultimate　religious
reality．　In　other　words，　it　may　be　that　Thomists’identification
of　God　with　Being，　and　of　existence　with　essence　in　God，　is
not　necessarily　right．
　　　　　In　my　opinion，　the　problem　of　analogy，　as　transference　of
human　language，　drawn　from　mundance　experience，　to　the
realm　of　the　Divine，　is　ontologically　preceded　by　the　nature　of
the　Divine　as　it　is　envisaged　by　us．　Hence，　analogy　can　be
conterminous　with“authentic　existence”as　correspondent　to　the
Divine　who　constitutes　the　fundamental　structure　of　reality．　I
admit　that　the　epistemological　and　logical　priorities　prevail　in
analogy　within　the　framework　of　the　epistemic　mode　of　being
insofar　as　we　are　concerned　in　epistemology　with“being　as
known”and　in　logic　with“modes　of　being　universally　accruing
to　things　as　known　in　and　for　second　intentional（i．e．，reflexive
－conceptual）knowledge．”6a　But　these　two　priorities　give　way　to
the　ontological　priority　when　it　comes　to　transferring　human
language　to　the　realm　of　the　Divine．　For　the　mode　of　signification
peculiar　to　epistmology　and　logic，　as　Thomas　Aquinas　claims，　is
to　be　superseded　by　the　perfection　signified，　that　is，　by　the
perfection　of　Being　or　the　Divine　inherent　in　things　as　things
which　epistemology　and　logic　must　both　presuppose．　Thus　the
final　question　in　the　problem　of　analogy　is：What　kind　of　vision
do　we　ultimately　have　about　Being　or　the　Divine？This　is　an
ontologica1，　not　an　epistemological　or　logical，　question．
　　　　　Therefore，　if　thereゴS，　as　l　aSSU〃le，　a　theologi°Cα1　S伽4ρ0傭
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．加〃zwhich　it　can　be〃zαゴη’α惚4伽’there　is　a砺π！脚〃砂醐c耐s
antecedent’o　God，　then　the　aノと〃・θ一mentioned’ッPe　of　analogy　obtainsα
strong　ontolo8ical　guarantee．　For　instance，　we　could　think　of　such
atriangular　standpoint　both　in　terms　of　the　distinction　of　the
two　natures　of　God（as　in　Luther，　s　deus　absconditus　or　the
Hidden　God　and　deus　revelatus　or　the　Revealed　God）and　in
terms　of　the　distinction　of　the　metaphysical　ultimate　and　the
religious　ultimate（as　in　Whitehead’screativity　and　God），with
the　world　being　the　experiential　basis　of　it　in　either　case．
　　　　　　These　two　cases　of　the　triangular　standpoint　provide
critical　correctives　for　the　entitative　view　of　God　in　Thomism
that　inheres　in　an　essentially　uneasy　admixture　of　God　as　ipszem
θssθsubusistens　and　God　as　primum　et　maxime　ens．　Thomists，
however，　would　claim　that　with　God　the　distinction　between　ens
or　essence　andθ∬θor　existence　does　not　hold，　and　that　God　is
His　own　e∬e．6b　But　this　claim，　quite　ironically，　is　to　lead　their
initial　existentialism　to　end　up　with　the　static　naming　of　God　as
the　uncaused　cause　or　causu　sui．　As　Heidegger　critically　assumed
in　the　essay　on“The　Onto－theological　Nature　of　Metaphysics，”
to　this　God　man　can　neither　pray　nor　sacrifice，　neither　fall　to
his　knee　in　awe　nor　sing　and　dance．th　It　is　precisely　in　view　of
this　difficulty　that　Luther’sreligious，　and　Whitehead’smetaphysical，
break－through　of　the　entitative　God　are　both　important　in　that
they　respectively　open　up　new　avenues　for　genuinely　perceiving
God　and　Being　or　creativity．　For　Luther　deus　absconditus，　who
orders　humans　to　live　according　to　retributive　justice，　is　made
intelligible　only　in　and　through　the　experience　of　the　revealed
God　in　Jesus　Christ．　For　Whitehead　God　as　primordial　is　perceived
only　as　the　primordial　exemplification　of　the　metaphysical
ultimate，　creativity．　God　is　now　the　One　who　supremely　and
maximally　concresces，　not　Being．　But　along　these　lines　it　might
be　still　possible　for　us　to　retain　the　proportionate－analogical
ontology　of　Thomism　in　some　sense．
　　　　　With　this　triangular　standpoint　in　mind，　I　shall　demonstrate
aα万sげ0109諺幽cal　vindication　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　duom〃z　czci’
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tertium　by　studying　Martin　Luther’sdoctrine　of　justification　and
prayer　in　Section　II　and　a　metaphysical　articulation　of　it　by
scrutinizing　Alfred　North　Whitehead’sphilosophy　of　organism　in
comparison　with　Kitaro　Nishida’sphilosophy　of　the　topos　of
absolute　Nothingness　in　Section　III．　As　shall　be　shown，　the
re－interpretation　of　this　analogy　in　terms　of　Luther’stheologia
cracz’刀@needs　the　supplements　by　Karl　Barth’sdoctrine　of　analogy
（involving　Analogia　Fidei　and　Analogia　Relationis）and　by
Wolfhart　Pannenberg，　s　doxological　analogy；and　our　Whiteheadian
use　of　this　analogy　accounts　for　the　proper　significance　of
Dorothy　Emmet’s，　Susanne　Langer’s，　and　Charles　Hartshorne’s
considerations　of　the　problem　of　analogy，　As　shall　be　articulated
in　Section　IV，　the　resultant　vision　is　a　creative　synthesis　of
Revealed　Theology　and　Natural　Theology－one　which　can
involve　in　a　coherent　manner　at　least　four　streams　of　philosophy
of　religion：Thomism，　Protestant　Confessionalism，　Whiteheadian
process　thought，　and　the　Nishida　School　of　Buddhist　philosophy．
Each　of　these，　in　my　view，　is　analogically　authentic　in　its
respectively　proper　articulation　of　the　fundamental　structure　of
reality．
　　　　　Section　ll：AChristological　Re－interpretation　of　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Analogy　of　Attribution　duorum　ad　tertiu〃z：
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Luther，　Barth，　and　Pannenberg
A．ルlartin　Luther：lustification　and　Prayer　in　The　Lectures　on
Romans（R6merbriefvorlesung）AsαHint
　　　　　Luther　himself　shows　no　sympathy　with　the　Thomistic
doctrine　of　analogy，　Analogia　Entis．7　This　might　be　because　he
finds　in　the　notion　of　existence　as　the“present　state　of　things”
astatic　ontology　devoid　of　the　Biblical　view　of　things“in　terms
of　what　they　will　be．”8　Therfore，　to　reinterpret　the　analogy　of
attribution　duomm　ad　tertium，　which　is　one　of　the　four　types　of
analogy　discussed　by　Thomas　Aquinas，　in　the　light　of　Luther’s
theologia　crucis　is　my　own　motif，　not　his．　However，　I　may　be
qualified　in　this　business　partly　by　the　fact　that　Aquinas　has
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discarded　this　type　of　analogy　for　the　reasons　mentioned　in　the
preceding　section，　and　partly　by　the　fact　that　Luther，　at　least
to　my　mind，　has　demonstrated　a　unique　possibility　of　speaking
of　God　commensurate　with　this　type　of　analogy－and　this　in
terms　of　his　pre－Reformation　doctrine　of　justification　and　prayer
deve　loped　in　the　1515－1516、RO〃zerbrt’efterlesung．
　　　　　It　is　Rudolf　Hermann　who　has　first　articulated　the　correlation
of　justification　and　prayer　in　Luther’sexegesis　of　Rom．3　in　the
Lectures．9　According　to　him，　Luther　has　come　to　realize　in　the
lectures　that　without　prayer　neither　justification　nor　ourselves
can　be　understood．lo　In　this　sense，　for　Luther　prayer　plays　the
role　of　interconnection　between　the　metaphysical　problem　of　the
Incarnation（“Cur　Deus　homo”）and　the　radical　transformation
of　one’s－evaluation－of－oneself　（“die　to　sin”），thus　entailing　the
doctrine　of　justification，　as　H．J．　Iwand　assumes，　as“a　sort　of
theological　anthropology．”11
　　　　　1think　it　important　in　this　connection　that　Luther　finds
the　motif　of“deum　iustificare”in　Rom，3：4（＝Ps．51：4）：“Let
God　be　true　though　every　man　be　false，　as　it　is　written，‘That
thou　mayest　be　justified　in　thy　words，　and　prevail　when　thou
art　judged’”（RSV）．He　writes：
　　　　　The　Greek　text　reads：‘God　shall　be　truthful’or　‘Let
　　　　　God　be　truthful．’These　words　give　expression　not　so
　　　　　much　to　the　truthfulness　of　God　as　to　a　confession　of　the
　　　　　truthfulness　of　God．　What　they　mean　is　this：It　is　right
　　　　　that　all　should　confess　and　admit　that　God　is　truthful．
　　　　　（LR，63－4）
　　　　　As　Hermann　rightly　notices　here，　the　believer　addresses
himself　or　herself　to　God　in　the　act　of　prayer；and　prayer　here
is　not　only　a　form　but　also　the　content　of　faith　itself．　In　the
acknowledgement　of　God’srighteousness　in　the　act　of　prayer
are　indeed　included　all　the　factors　of　Christian　faith－justification，
repentance，　and　new　life．12　Further，　in　it　is　included，　in　my
opinion，　a　new　possibility　of　the　use　of　the　analogy　of　attribution
duontmα4　tertium．
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　　　　　　It　is　very　important　that　Luther　distinguishes　between
saying　simply　that“God　is　justified”and　saying　that“God　is
justified　in　his　words　or　works．”For“God　as　he　is　in　himself
can　be　justified　by　none，　because　he　is　justice　itself，　nor　can　be
judged，　because　he　himself　is　eternal　law　and　judgment　and
truth”（LR，64）．This　is　because　for　Luther　God’slife　touches
us　in　two　ways：he　is　first　God　as　he　is　in　himself　or　the
Hidden　God（4θ％s　abscond吻s　or　nudus）emerging　in　creation’s
masks　and　ordering　humans　to　live　according　to　the　principle　of
retributive　justice；but　we　also　find　God　as　the　Revealed　One
（4顔srevelatus），in　Jesus　Christ．13　He　therefore　knows　both　the
tremencim　relement　and　the加゜nosu〃i－element　of　God’srighteousness．
　　　　　If　that　is　the　case，　we　can　here　notice　a　case　that　there
is　a　third　reality，　i．e．，4θ麗s　nudus　orごzわsconditus，　antecedent　to
God　as　deus　rezAelatzts　and　humanity－a　vindication　of　the　theological
validity　of　the　analogy　of　attribution　duoru〃2α4　tertiu〃z．　It
follows　that　we　might　explicate　the　analogy　in　terms　of　the
notion　of　justice　or　righteousness　in　the　following　fivefold
manner・
　　　　　（1）God　as　he　is　in　himself　or　deus　nudus　or　a∂scontitus　is
justice　itself；he　is　therefore　to　be　called　the　prime　analogate　in
which　justice　exists　inthnsically．
　　　　　（2）By　contrast，　the　Revealed　God（deus　revelatus）in　J6sus
Christ　is　a　creative－redemptive　justice；he　is　therefore　the　first
minor　analogate　in　which　justice　exists　extrinsically－extrinsically
in　the　sense　of　the　ad　extra　relationship　of　God　to　humanity，
that　is，　the　Incarnation．
　　　　　（3）Prayer，　as　the　confessional　existence　of　the　Christian
believer，　is　the　second　minor　analogate；as　such，　it　is　utterly
devoid　of　its　own　retributive　or　meritorious　justice　before　God
as　he　is　in　himself　and　yet　is　righteous　in　that　it　receives
justice　as　a　creative－redemptive　gift　from　the　first　minor　analogate，
the　Revealed　God　as　the　exthnsic　justice　of　God，　in　response　to
its　innermost，　Augustinian　petition：1）αquod吻66s（Give　me
what　you　order）．
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　　　　　　（4）The　relation　of　the　first　minor　analogate　to　the
second　one　can　be　called　the　analogy　of　attribution　unius　ad
altemm，　in　the　sense　of　a　salvific　interpersonalism　between　Jesus
as　the　Christ　and　the　believer　as　he　or　she　is　confessionally
existing；thus　the　extrinsic　justice　of　God　is　extrinsic　in　its
double　sense－that　is，　extrinsic　to　the　believer　as　well　as　to　the
Hidden　God，　the　reason　why　Luther　calls　Christ’sredemptive
love“alien　righteousness”@（iustitia　aliena）．
　　　　　　（5）In　conclusion，　our　new　interpretation　of　the　analogy
means　that　the　believer　existentially－confessionally　induces（or，
rather，　r6ceives），the　Revealed　God　manifests，　and　the　Hidden
God　enjoys，　justice．　Here　the　transferability　of　justice－language
to　God　is　based　upon　the　paradoxical　fact，　which　is　at　the　core
of　Luther’stheologt’a　c71tCts，　that　God　is　everywhere　in　terms　of
ontology　as　it　is　best　explicated　by　the　Thomistic　Analogy　of
Being　and　yet　is　nowhere　other　than　in　Jesus　Christ　and　him
crucified　in　terms　of　salvation．　We　could　express　this　truth　with
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　のthese　two　formulae：（1）from　the　divine　perspective，　HB（mySten’um
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　コゆ
tremendum）＝HR（lncarnation）十RB（Justification）；and（2）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ロコ　ゆ　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ
from　the　human　perspective，　BH（coram　Dω）＝BR（Faith）十
のRH（Atonement）．（See　Fig．　I　below．）
H（The　Hidden　God　as　Justioe　Itself）
　　　　　　　B
（The　Believer）
Fig．1
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　R
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（The　Revealed
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（演as　Creative
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Justi㏄）
　　　　　Pivotal　in　our　re－interpretation　of　the　analogy，　as　in　the
above，　is　the　fact　that　we　have　found　in　Luther　a　dual　vision
of　the　Deity　as　both　Hidden　and　Revealed．　This　vision　provides
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us　a　theological　means　by　which　to　challenge　the　Thomistic
charge　that　the　prime　analogate　in　the　analogy　is　simply　a
“genus，”@and　that　the　logic　inherent　in　the　analogy　is“generic
predication”which　ru，ns　counter　to　the　essence　of　the　theological
analogy，　Analogia　Entis．　The　Hidden　God　is　not　a　genus　but　a
divine　reality　which　is　above　and　beyond　the　reality　of　the
Revealed　God．　Accordingly，　our　predication　of　this　God　as
juistice　in　terms　of　the　analogy　of　attribution吻ontm　czci「tertium，
as　in　point　5　above，　is　not　a　generic　one　but　is　a　confessional
adoration　of　Him，　while　mediated　by　our　faith　in　the　Revealed
God．
　　　　　As　such，　our　predication　of　God　as　justice（i．e．，“deecm
iustificare”）necessarily　takes　the　form　of　confession　of　sin．　For，
as　Luther　states，
　　　　　．．．there　it　is　stated　that　God　is　justified　by　the　confession
　　　　　of　our　sin．　Even　though　he　is　righteous　and　truthful　in
　　　　　himself，　he　is　not　so　in　us　unless　we　confess　and　say：
　　　　　“Against　thee　only，　have　I　sirlned”（Ps．51：4）．Then　he
　　　　　is　acknowledged　as　the　only，　righteous　one．　And　so　he　is
　　　　　made　hghteous　also　in　us，（LR，66）
Further，
　　　　　Oh，　that　we　might　willingly　be　emptied　that　we　might　be
　　　　　filled　with　thee；Oh，　that　I　may　willingly　be　weak　that
　　　　　thy　strength　may　dwell　in　me；gladly　a　sinner　that　thou
　　　　　mayest　be　justified　in　me（Libenter　peccator　ut伽ゴ嘘加6碗s
　　　　　伽〃zの．（LR，70－1）
　　　　　Thus　justification　is，　for　Luther，“a　livin　g　process，　a
becoming　and　happening，　into　which　God　himself　enters，　and
into　which　he　drags　the　human　being．”14　This　is　because　God　is
not，　as　Aquinas　assumes，　a　transcendent　cause（which　is　to　be
understood　by　the　Thomistic　Analogy　of　Being　consisting　of　the
analogy　of　proper　proportionality　combined　with　the　analogy　of
attribution　z〃ziusご24　a〃eru〃2）　but　a　living，　personal　reality．15
Luther　resorts　to　the　metaphor　of　the　good　Samaritan（Luke
10：30ff．）to　depict　justification　as　such　a　living，　personal　encounter
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of　God　with　humanity．　For　him　Christ　is　the　Good　Samaritan；
under　the　aspect　of　his　salvific　action　for　us　sinners　we　are　all
like　the　sick　man　who　is　actually　sick，　but　who　is　healthy　by
virtue　of　the　sure　prediction　of　the　physician　whom　he　believes
（LR，127）．Here　we　can　see　a　most　articulate　example　of　the
analogy　of　metaphorical　proportionality．
B．1（とzrl、＆z7〃z’　／1nelog　2’αFidei　and／1nalogta。Relationis
　　　　　As　elucidated　above，　inherent　in　Luther’sdoctrine　of
justification　and　prayer　are　three　types　of　analogy　（i．e．，the
analogy　of　attribution　dzamzt〃2α4　tertiu〃z，　the　analogy　of　attribution
um’浮刀@o4α〃emm，　and　the　analogy　of　metaphorical　proportionality）
which　are　combined　in　a　tight　linkage．　This　is，　as　I　admitted
in　the　prededing　sub－section，　my　own　view，　not　his．　It　is　my
contention　in　this　connection　that　the　basic　structure　of　Protestant
Confessional　theology　consists　in　the　combination　of　these　three
types　of　analogy，　with　the　analogy　of　attribution　duoram　ad
tertium　being　the　key　analogy　in　accordance　with　the　dual　vision
of　the　Deity　as　Hidden　and　Revealed．　This　may　lead　to　a
critical　evaluation　of　the　Thomistic　Analogy　of　Being　as　only
hypothetically　true　in　view　of　human　depravity．
　　　　　It　is　within　this　context　that　we　can　properly　understand
the　true　significance　of　Karl　Barth’sdoctrine　of　analogy　involving
Analogia　Fidei　and　Analogia　Relationis．　In　my　opinion，　his
Analogia　Fidei　can　make　sense　as　a　clarification　of　the　analogy
of　attribution　z〃zius　adα〃eru〃z　inherent　in　the　relationship
between　the　believer　and　the　Revealed　God．　And　his　Analogia
Relationis　is　an　attempt　at　elucidating　the　analogy　of　metaphorical
proportionality　hidden　in　the　relationship　between　the　triune
God　and　humanity．
　　　　　1．．4紹108如躍4θゴ．In　my　opinion，　the　content　of　Analogia
Fidei　was　already　implicit　in　Barth’searliest　work，　R∂merbrief
（1918），although　it　is　said　that　his　theological　method　shifted，
concomitant　with　the　publication　of」Fides　Q％αθ貫召ηs　Inte〃6伽吻．
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Anselms　Bセzveis　der　Existenz　Gottes　in　1931，　from　a　dialectical　one
to　an　analogical　one．161n　the　exegesis　of　Rom．8：26，“．．．　but
the　Spirit　with　pre－eminent　power　makes　intercession　for　us
with　groanings　which　cannot　be　uttered，”he　poses　his　dialectical
method　in　terms　of　the“justification　of　prayer”as　follows：
　　　　　The　justification　of　our　prayer　is　not　that　we　have　attained
　　　　　some　higher　eminence　on　the　ladder　of　prayer；for　all
　　　　　ladders　of　prayer　are　erected　within　the　sphere　of　the
　　　　　　‘No－God’of　this　world．　The　justification　of　our　prayer
　　　　　and　the　reality　of　our　communion　with　God　are　grounded
　　　　　upon　the　truth　that　Another，　the　Eternal，　the　Second
　　　　　Man　from　Heaven（I　Cor．　xv．47），stands　before　God
　　　　　pre－eminent　in　power　and－in　our　place．17
　　　　　Here　prayer，　as　human　piety，　is　once　totally　negated　and
yet　is　restored　on　the　basis　of　the　intercession　of　the　living
Christ．　This　is　because　for　Barth　Christ，　being　the　end　of
history　or　the　pre－history，　is　the　origin　of　time．18　Christ，　as　the
finis　orationis　or　the　radical　negation　of　human　religiosity，　is　the
origin　of　prayer（P万nu・°ρ伽〃z　o勉’ゴo窺’s）．Thus　he　is　the　justification
of　our　prayer．
　　　　　We　could　compare，　then，　this　notion　with　Barth’slater
definition　of　Analogia　Fidei　in　Church　1）ogmatics，1／1（1932）．
There　Barth　understands“analogia”or　what　he　calls“man’s
conformity　with　God　which　takes　place　in　faith，　and　the‘point
of　contact’with　the　Word　of　God　posited　in　this　conformity”as
“the　sole　work　of　the　actual　grace　of　God［such］that　the　only
final　word　left　us　at　this　point　is　that　God　acts　in　His　word　on
man，”b浮煤@not　as“an　inborn　or　accessory　attribute　of　man．”19
By　this　he　has　rejected　the　Thomistic　idea　of　Analogia　Entis，
together　with　Emil　Brunner’sidea　of　the“point　of　contact”
between　God　and　the　human　being　and　Rudolf　Bultmann’sidea
of“pre－understanding”of　God　by　the　human　being，　inasmuch
as　these　ideas　presuppose　an　independent　and　isolated　human
reasoning　apart　from　God’sself－disclosure　in　Jesus　Christ．
Hence，　Barth’snotion　of　Analogia　Fidei　is　expressive　of　the
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divine，　gracious雌勿oc卿with　us　as　we　are　in　faith，　the　fact
which　is　commensurate　with　his　notion　of　the　justification　of
prayer。
　　　　　Barth　himself　does　not　use　the　term“univocity，”though．
It　is　my　own　interpretation　of　his　Analogia　Fidei　to　find　in　it
the　element　of　univocity，　the　element　which　was　totally　negated
by　Aquinas　in　his　Analogia　Entis．　In　including　the　element　of
univocity－which　I　prize　here　only　insofar　as　it　obtains　its
significance　in　the　ontological　order（ordoθ∬endの　of　God’s
self－disclosure　to　us，　rather　than　in　the　epitemological　order
（αrdoαンn8noscendi）of　our　human　faculty　of　knowing　God－in　the
notion　of　analogy　implying　the　knowability　of　God　I　am　in　line
with　Duns　Scotus　and　William　of　Ockham．19a　However，　I　can
find　some　rationale　for　my　standpoint　in　Barth　himself；he
regards　Analogia　Entis　as　theologically　untenable　because　it　is
the　analogy　to　which　we　resort　only　in　a　situation　in　which
“we　do　not　have　to　consider　the　being　of　God　in　His　work　and
activity，　but　only　as　such　and加αδs伽c’o，”201n　other　words，　for
Barth　it　is　essential　to　include　the　salvific　activity　of　God　for　us
in　the　notion　of　analogy，
　　　　　2．．4nelo8t’αRelatiom－’∫．　Strangely　enough，　however，　when
it　comes　to　accounting　for　Analogia　Relationis，　Barth’suse　of
the　te㎜“analogy”tends　to　l£metaphohc訓rather　than　univocal．
Analogia　Relationis　is　a　sort　of　the　analogy　of　metaphorical
proportionality，　as　I　mentioned　before．　What　is　the　reason　for
this　strange　fact？My　explanation　is　as　follows．
　　　　　For　Barth　God　as　he　is　in　himself　is　relational　because　he
is　triune　in　that　he　is，　as　Father，　related　to　Son　and　vice
versa（and　this　in　terms　of　the　communication　as　love　of　Holy
Spirit），21　and　humanity　is　also　relational　because　it　consists　in
the　male－female　relationship，　the　most　visible　feature　of　the
伽ago　1）ei．22　The　divine　and　human　relationalities　are　combined
analogically，　the　former　providing　the　ontological　basis　for　the
latter　and　the　latter　corresponding　to　the　former．　As　Eberhard
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JUngel　rightly　points　out，　for　Barth　the　doctrine　of　the　Trinity，
by　the　proposition　of　the　peηichcrest’s（Lat．，circuminessio；Ger．，
Kreislauf；Eng．，circulation）of　the　three　divine　modes　of
being，　is　the　ontological　basis　for　Analogia　Relationis　between
God’sbeing　for　himself　and　his　being　for　us．23　However，　Barth
does　not　want　to　speak　of　the　divine－human　relationship　as
datum　but　only　as　dandum，　that　is，　something　to　be　given　to　us
by　the　Holy　Spirit　in　the　midst　of　our　act　of　faith．　Thus，
Analogia　Relationis　is　fundamentally　conditioned　by　Analogia
Fidei．24
　　　　　　H伽ωθ7，砺s伽ρ1ゴθs’1疵Bα肋has　not伽〃ッαrticulated漉θ
difference　betueen〃re（）ntologi’cal　relationship　betueen　God　ancl　hu〃urm°砂
and　our　knowledge　o∫it．　It　is　true　that　we　need　faith　in　order
fully　to　come　to　realize　the　divine－human　relationship．　But　it　is
also　true　that　the　divine－human　relationship　itself　is　a　reality
which　exists　befere　our　knowledge　of　it　emerges　in　faith．　This　is
the　issue　which　has　been　critically　raised　by　one　of　Barth’s
Japanese　pupils，　Katsumi　Takizawa．　Takizawa’scontention　is，
in　short，　that　the　fundamental　contact　of　God　and　humanity　lies
at　the　bottom　of　our　human　existence　prior　to　the　Incarnation
of　the　Word　of　God　in　Jesus　of　Nazareth．　Hence，　he　calls　this
contact　the　Proto一ノ認％吻Immanuel（God　with　us）identifiable
with　the　Logos．　Barth’serror，　according　to　Takizawa，　is　that
he　views　the　Proto一ノilctum　as　first　initiated　by　the　Incarnation．25
Takizawa’scharge　is　basically　right，　but　it　should　be　consolidated
in　more　precise　terms　in　view　of　the　fact　that　Barth　himself
speaks　of　the　pre－history　as　the　being　of　Jesus　in　the　beginning
with　God．261n　my　own　view，　Barth’sreference　to　the　pre－existent
God－man　still　lacks　the　ontological　motivation　of　the　unity　of
God　withα〃creation（not　merely　with　the　man　Jesus）－the
reason　why　Takizawa’smotif　of　the　Proto一ノね6伽駕Immanuel　is
theologically　tenable．
　　　　　However，　it　seems　to　me　that　Takizawa　does　not　probe
into　the　real，　or　more　serious，　weakness　in　the　theology　of
Karl　Barth：in　his　theology　the　intra－trinitarian　Godhead”is　not
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conceived　of　as　both　immediately　and　internally　related　to　the
inner　composition　of　creatures，　including　humans．　What　is
imp6rtant　now　is　not　the　pre－existent　Christ　or　the　Logos　but
some　kind　of　an　immediate　ontological　relationality　of　the
Godhead　and　creation　which　is　pre－congnitive　but　real　and　of
which　the　Logos　is　the　supreme　embodiment．　This　is　the　area
of　philosophical　theology　that　is　discussed　neither　by　Barth　nor
by　Takizawa　but　is　explored　by　Whitehead　and　Buddhists　in
terms　of　what　they　respectively　call“creativity”and“Emptiness
qzea　dependent　co－origination．”28　But　it　is　beyond　the　scope　of
the　preseht　section　to　consider　the　matter　further．　Suffice　it　to
say　that　because　Barth　does　not　base　his　doぐtrine　of　Analogia
Relationis　upon　an　internally　significant　relationship　between
the　Godhead　and　creation　but　rather　upon　a　merely　formal　one
（i．e．，the　male－female　partnership），it　is　no　more　than　an
analogy　of　metaphorical　proportionality．
C．17Volflazrt　Panneberg．°Doxologt’cal　Anelogy
　　　　　As　we　can　truly　understand　the　motif　of　Barth’stheology
as　emerging　only　in　response　to　Luther’stheologt°αcmcz’s，　so　we
can　truly　elucidate　the　intent　of　Pannenberg’stheological
analogy　only　againt　the　background　of　Barthianism．　Pannenberg
has　learned　at　least　two　things　from　Barth：one　is　revelation　as
the　only　real　context　of　the　problem　of　analogy　and　the　other　is
the　view　of　Analogia　Fidei　as　involving　the　univocal　element　in
the　grace　of　God（KD，1／1，252）．ee　Yet，　he　is　critical　of　Barth
in　two　respects．　First，　Barth　does　not　pay　due　attention　to　the
situation　in　which　the　Christian　revelation　，　while　encountering
humanity，　is　limited　by　the　structure　of　the　human　partner；
that　is　to　say，　Barth　does　not　take　into　account　the　modus
significandi　of　analogy．30　Second，　Barth　asserts　that　God　is
“objective”in　his　revelation（KD，　II／1，232）．But　for　Pannenberg
God’sobjectivity　in　the　Christ－event　does　not　mean　Jesus’direct
answer　to　the　messianic　expectation　of　Judaism；rather，　his
objectivity　is　broken　in　Jesus’　death　under　a　curse；only　the
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resurrection　of　Jesus　from　the　dead　can　speak　to　us　crossing
over　that　brokenness．31
　　　　　　1t　is　against　the　background　of　these　considerations　that
Pannenberg　poses　his　doctrine　of　doxological　analogy．　It　is
interesting　to　notice　that　he　draws　the　ontological　grounding　for
doxological　speech　about　God　from　the　Lutheran　motif　of“deum
iustificare”mentioned　earlier．　For　instance，　it　is　for　Pannenberg
on　the　basis　of　his　deeds　that　God　is　praised　as　eternally　good，
righteous，　and　faithful．32　This　is　because“．．．　we　grasp，　by
means　of　a　single　event，　the　totality　of　the　reality　in　which　we
live　and　around　which　our　lives　circulate，”33　God　being　the
origin　of　that　totality．341t　follows　that　all　speech　about　God　is
provisional，　grounded　in　the　character　of　all　such　speech　as
“analogous　transference　in　the　worshipful　glorification　of　God’s
sublimity．”35　Thus　Pannenberg’slogic　is　quite　Lutheran（see　II，
Aabove）．
　　　　　Hozuener，　itゴs　Pα膨吻79’s　un吻e　contrt’伽競’oα纏θ〃zPorary
theology　that　he　has翅伽〃20’げ0ア“analogi’cal　transference勿伽
zuarshiPful　glorification　OアGod’S　sub〃〃吻”翻O　the　context　of　leSUS’
history，　therebyω〃zPleting　our　figure　of　the　anelogy　Oアattribution
duorum　ad　tertium．　As　a　result，　he　has　provided　a　Christological
basis　for　doxological　speech　about　God；and，　conversely，　he　has
elucidated　the　analogical　significance　of　the　historical　Jesus　in
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　のrelation　to　the　eternal　Logos（i．e．，　RH　in　Fig．　I　above）．　This
is　important　in　that　he　has　thereby　broken　through　the　rigidity
or　stiffness　of　Barth’sconcept　of“objective　revelation”at　least
in　the　following　senses：
　　　　　　（1）Pannenberg　replaces　the　objectivity－concept　with　the
provisionality　peculiar　to　human　language，　the　fact　that　he
誼ims，　with　Thomas　Aquinas，　the翅（idus　Si’a伽励of　analogy．
Christologically，　this　means　that　the　metaphorical　or　provisional
character　of　our　speech　about　God　was　shared　by　Jesus　when　he
spoke　of　God　as“father．”36
　　　　　（2）Pannenberg　does　not，　however，　obliterate　the　univocal
element　in　analogy　and　in　the　Christian　revelation－his　Barthian
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approval　of　God’sfreedom　and　decision．　Christologically，　this
means　that　the　ultimacy　of　the　self－demonstration　of　God　is
grounded　in　Jesus’own　claim　to　possess　full　authority　to
execute　the　ultimate　will　of　God　over　every　man　who　encountered
him．37
　　　　　（3）Pannenberg　clarifies　the　proleptic　element　in　analogy
and　revelation，　to　the　effect　that　the　univocal　element　is　itself
provisional　or　metaphorical　in　reference　to　the　perfectio　sigηificata
as　the　Eschaton．　Christologically，　this　means　that，　although　the
resurrection　of　Jesus　from　the　dead　brought　about　for　the　first
time　a　confirmation　of　his　claim　by　God　himself，380ur　speech
about　God　on　the　basis　of　Jesus’resurrection　still　remains
provisional　due　to　its　character　as　the　fore－conception　of　the
universal　end　of　history．39
　　　　　However，　the　problem　is　that　Pannenberg　fails　to　fully
acknowledge　that，　while　our　speech　about　God　is　provisional
and　indirect，　the　ontological　relationship　of　God　to　humanity　in
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　りJesus　Christ（i．e．，HR　or　Incarnation）can　be，　and　actually　is，
immediately　real．40　Analogy　as　our　human　adoration　of　God
presupposes　God’simmediate　relationship　to　us．　To　express　the
same　thing　in　terms　of　my　interpretation　of　the　analogy　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ　　　　　コゆ　　　　　－ゆ　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ゆ
attribution　duontm　ad　tertium，　BH＝BR十RH　presupposes　HB
　　ロ　　ゆ　　　　　ロ　　ゆ
＝HR十RB（see　Fig．1）．As　such，　the　former　formula　testifies
to　the　authenticity　of　the　Protestant　Confessional　existence　as
“righteous．”
（To　be　continued）
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＊This　is　a　revised　version　of　a　paper　originally　presented　at　a
Round　Table　session　which　was　held　in　the　American　Academy　of
Religion　Annual　Meeting　at　Palmer　House　in　Chicago，　December
8－10，1984in　preparation　for　the　creation　of　a　new　AAR　consultation
on“orocess　Thought，　the　Nishida　School　of　Buddhist　Ph三losophy　in
Comparative　Perspective．”
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